PSYWAR AND THE FUTURE OF KASHMIR

The list of the 20 signatories to the open statement on the captioned subject carried by The New Indian Express in its edition of September 19, 2008 reads like a who’s who of people who in their various capacities as senior government officials, diplomats, top brass of the Indian armed forces, Intelligence and security agencies’ chiefs, responsible members of the press, and leaders of industry, could have exercised their combined and considerable influence in resolving what has become an intractable problem—the conflict in Kashmir. But the fact remains that even sixty years after the “unquestionable” accession of Kashmir to India we are still fighting a secessionist insurgency in the state, overtly and covertly supported by a hostile neighbour.

It is very well to quote the authority of the Constitution, and to reassert “national will” and “state power”. But when a whole population of a section of a state is demanding freedom, and waging war to attain it, we cannot take shelter behind considerations of “a nation aspiring to become a major player in global power dynamics”. To state that “there is no basis on which any change in the political status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir could be considered” without providing an alternative solution to end insurgency and bring peace to this troubled valley is to escape responsibility while sounding patriotic. Just saying and repeatedly asserting “as proud and patriotic Indians who strongly believe that the unity and secular democratic fabric of our republic must be preserved at all costs” and calling upon “the Government of India to make it unequivocally clear at the highest level that under no circumstances will the government and people of India countenance any compromise with the integrity of the nation” has not made the problem disappear. Such statements look nice in print and sound very lofty. But they alone are not enough to make the affected people to suspend and terminate their protests and return to a peaceful way of existence. From such a formidable galaxy of minds and experience one would have expected at least a half-solution to the problem, but what we have is nothing but a repetition of pious declarations, clichés, and platitudinous exhortations.

Extraordinary situations require extraordinary solutions. And there is no denying the fact that the situation in Kashmir is extraordinary. The insurgency since 1989 has wreaked havoc on the social, cultural, ethnic and religious fabric of not only Jammu & Kashmir, but on the entire nation. What the Kashmiri Pandits have faced is nothing short of ethnic cleansing, and from being an integral part of the valley, have today been reduced to becoming refugees in their own country, living in abysmal conditions in shanties spread over the city of Jammu and its suburbs. Even there they are just tolerated, as their presence has put pressure on the economic resources of the province, leading to escalation in the prices of land and other commodities. The Pandits are also competing for jobs with the people of Jammu, and such situations can only exacerbate conflict. There were about 1,25,000 Pandits in the valley before the insurrection. Today, I believe there are a mere 7,000 left, perhaps because they have nowhere else to go, living in mortal fear, existing practically from day to day. Their lives can be snuffed out by any or all of the militant groups operating in the valley without a second thought. The Kashmiri Pandits today are practically on the verge of extinction as the ‘aspiring major player in global power dynamics” has no time for them. They are an expendable community as they do not constitute enough numbers to qualify as a vote bank.

The cascading effect of the insurgency and the proxy war in Kashmir on the rest of India has not been fully comprehended by the signatories. That Pakistan has taken advantage of the disaffection in Kashmir and utilized it to further its own agenda of weakening the unity of the Indian state cannot be denied. Wajahat Habibullah, perhaps the most qualified commentator on Kashmir, says in his book, “My Kashmir, Conflict and the Prospect of enduring Peace” that for Pakistan Kashmir may be the core issue, but “the explanation of Pakistan’s unabated hostility lies elsewhere. It is characterized by Pakistan’s quest for balance with India since 1947. This quest led to an overemphasis on the military budget, giving the army a privileged – and, unduly powerful – political status even when Pakistan was not under direct military rule. It lies in the quest for a distinct identity of a state that aspired, on its creation, to represent the Muslims of the entire Indian subcontinent even though it became home for fewer than one-third”.

The idea of letting the valley separate is not something of recent origin. Philip Spratt, an English journalist, editing a Bangalore journal MysIndia, wrote in 1952 that India should abandon its claim over Kashmir, and allow Sheikh Abdullah to realize his dream of independence. Spratt wanted the Indian army to be withdrawn from J & K and all loans to the state written off. ‘Let Kashmir go ahead, alone and adventurously, in her explorations of a secular state’, he wrote. ‘We shall watch the act of faith with due sympathy but at a safe distance, our honour, our resources and our future free from the enervating entanglements which write a lie in our soul.’ Ramachandra Guha, in “India After Gandhi” writes, “Spratt’s solution was tinged with morality, but more so with economy and prudence. Indian policy, he argued, was based on ‘a mistaken belief in the one-nation theory and greed to own the beautiful and strategic valley of Srinagar’. The costs of this policy, present and future, were incalculable. Rather than give Kashmir special privileges and create resentment elsewhere in India, it was best to let the state go. As things stood, however, Kashmir ‘was in the grip of two armies glaring at each other in a state of armed neutrality. It may suit a handful of people to see the indefinite continuance of this ghastly situation. But the Indian taxpayer is paying through his nose for the precarious privilege of claiming Kashmir as part of India on the basis of all the giving on India’s side and all the taking on Kashmir’s side’.”

Pakistan has been pushing militant Jihadis of different nationalities like Sudan, Chechnya, Afghanistan, etc., to wage low intensity war in Kashmir and to train militant outfits across India. The increase in acts of violence against soft targets across the country is calculated to destroy the communal and social harmony in the country. And we have to admit that Pakistan has been more than reasonably successful in its nefarious designs. If it had not been for some covert and overt pressure from the USA after 9/11, the situation could have been much worse.

Today, the state of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be compared with any other state within the Indian union. Its three provinces are as dramatically distinct from one another as Tamil Nadu is from Haryana, or Bengal is from Gujarat. The people of Jammu are predominantly of a Punjabi culture. Even the Muslims of the Jammu province come from Rajput stock, speak a Punjabi dialect, and hold the valley Kashmiri Muslims in contempt, The Pandits and the Muslims of the valley originate from the same ethnic stock, speak the same language, which is a variant of Dardic, and have almost similar dietary habits. The Ladakhis are more akin to Tibetans, almost identical in diet and attire. The Jammu province is predominantly Hindu; Ladakh is almost equally Buddhist and Muslim, while the Kashmir valley is almost cent percent Muslim. It is unfortunate that the militants had to target a hapless, hopeless minority, who could not, and did not, pose any threat to Muslim majoritarianism in the state. The Pandits were anyway being forced by discriminatory methods to leave the state and to look for educational and employment opportunities in the rest of the country and abroad. The objective of cleansing the valley of the “non-believers” could have been achieved without violence. But Pakistan was in a hurry and it found willing allies in the disaffected youth of the valley. Being preoccupied with the exigencies of national politics, rather than with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, the Indian governments failed to develop a workable long range policy for Kashmir. Corruption and nepotism among the political leaders of Kashmir, and the Indian government’s complicity in letting such conditions persist led to a quick alienation of the youth. It is the state’s misfortune that apart from Sheikh Abdullah, no political leader has emerged who would be acceptable to all the people. At the time of partition, the Sheikh had a choice: join Pakistan, a Muslim nation but under Punjabi leadership, or join a secular nation where Kashmiris would be free to live as they chose. Sheikh Abdullah chose the second option, and to his credit, never deviated from this stand. The Indian government, in a series of blunders while dealing with Kashmir, made its first great blunder when it dismissed Sheikh Abdullah’s government and arrested him in 1953. From then onwards it has been a continuous pattern in political and administrative insincerity in dealing with Kashmir. Elections routinely rigged, corrupt and unpopular leaders installed through financially engineered defections, convinced the people that New Delhi would only allow supplicants to rule. The reactive rather than proactive response to challenges led to trigger-happy decisions, resulting in such monumental tragedies as the unprovoked firing on the funeral procession of Mirwaiz Moulavi Farooq in May 1990, causing the death of 27 mourners; the firing on a crowd of civilians in Bijbehara following the siege at Hazratbal, and countless violations of human rights in the valley. Escalating violence inevitably leads to escalating human rights abuse, both by the militants and by the security forces.

Keeping this reality of the situation on the ground in mind, and holding the cause of peace as more important than some misplaced sense of power and superiority, does one recommend a solution that takes into account the aspirations and yearnings of the people of Kashmir. The continuous violence and disturbance has led to such confusion that Kashmiris themselves are unable to define what they mean by azadi. But a politically independent, but powerless state, situated in one of the world’s most volatile regions, flanked by rival nuclear powers, has no hope that it will be left in peace.

To believe that if the valley separates because it is Muslim dominated will have its own repercussions in the rest of the country, is not a valid argument. Geographically, apart from Kashmir, these Muslims are not a majority in any of the states contiguous with Pakistan. Further, as the honourable signatories have averred: “the overwhelming majority of Indian Muslims, who constitute over 15 per cent of the population, has absolutely no sympathy for the partisan few who still fan a tired idea called secession”. In fact if the Kashmir valley is allowed to separate it will take the wind out of the sails of the Islamists, and will leave Pakistan with no excuse to further its nefarious designs in India. The move will release the vast military apparatus tied down in the valley that can be deployed for better security in the rest of the country. It will also save the national exchequer vast amounts of money literally going down the drain in the valley. Internationally too the country will gain as the allegations of human rights violations, true or imaginary, will cease and India will be able to occupy its rightful place in the comity of nations. Pakistan, on the other hand, could also benefit, as it will have no more reason to maintain a huge military establishment, thereby reducing the role of the armed forces in its governance. The country may eventually grow out of its medievalist mind-set and achieve some kind of democracy. A less hostile, democratic neighbour can only be good for India and the subcontinent.